Abstract-Extensive research has been performed to study selfish data caching in ad hoc networks using game-theoretic analysis. However, due to the caching problem's theoretical root in classic facility location problem and k-median problem, most of the research assumes i), the data items are initially outside of the network, and ii), the caching cost is either a constant or not considered. In this paper, we study a general data caching model in which the data item is initially in the network, and both caching and access cost are distance-dependent in multi-hop ad hoc networks. We first show the studied problem is NP-hard. We construct a pure Nash Equilibrium, in which a node will not deviate its caching strategy if others remain theirs. However, a NE may not guarantee social optimal cost -due to the selfishness of each node, the price of anarchy, which is the relative cost of the lack of cooperation among nodes, could be as large as O(N ), where N is number of nodes in the network. Using an external incentive mechanism based upon a payment model, we construct a Nash Equilibrium wherein social optimal is also achieved.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ad hoc networks are multi-hop wireless networks consisting of small wireless computing devices such as conventional computers (e.g., PDA, laptop, or PC), or embedded processors such as tiny, low-cost, and low-power sensor motes. Ad hoc networks are constructed mainly for the information sharing and task coordination among a group of people, without the support of any communication infrastructure. For example, in an ad hoc network established for spontaneous meeting, several authors can meet and coordinate to modify the same document (e.g., an article or a powerpoint slides) in a distributed fashion. Similarly, in interconnected distributed information systems, an object (a web page, an image, a video clip, or a file) may be accessed from multiple distributed locations (network nodes) simultaneously.
Caching has been proposed to be an effective technique to facilitate information access in ad hoc networks. Besides the traditional advantages brought by caching such as less data access latency, improved data reliability and fault tolerance, utilizing caching to optimize network performance of ad hoc networks is motivated by the following two aspects. First, the ad hoc networks are multi-hop networks. Thus, remote access of information typically occurs via multi-hop routing, wherein access latency can be particularly improved by data caching. Second, ad hoc networks are generally resource constrained in terms of wireless bandwidth, memory capacity and battery energy of nodes. Data caching can help reduce communication cost among nodes, which results in conserving battery energy and minimizing bandwidth usage in ad hoc networks.
Due to above reasons, recently many caching techniques have been developed to achieve good overall performance of the ad hoc network [4, 5, 16, 18, 19] . They are all cooperative caching techniques wherein nodes follow carefully designed protocols to achieve good system performance. One effect of such cooperative caching is that some nodes have to possibly cache data items which are most accessed by other nodes instead of themselves. Such mistreatment [11] renders those nodes to break away from the group and operate in isolation using a local greedy replication scheme, in which they store the data they access most in the local memory, instead of data items most accessed by other nodes.
Several research has been performed to address above selfish data caching behavior using game-theoretic analysis [2, 3, 7, 10] . Historically, data caching and the related cache placement problem have the theoretical root in facility location problem [6] and k-median problem [1] , which study how to place caching/facility in the network with least cost. In the facility-location problem, setting up a cache at a node incurs a certain fixed cost, and the goal is to minimize the sum of total access cost and the cache setting-up costs of all caches, without any constraint. The k-median problem minimizes the total access cost under the number constraint, i.e., that at most k nodes can be selected as caches, without considering caching setting-up costs. In both problems, the facilities to be set up are not initially in the network. As a result, most of work of selfish data caching assume that i) the data items are initially outside of the network and ii) the caching cost is either a constant or does not exist (please refer to Section II for a complete literature survey).
While this assumption is valid in many situations, there are many applications where the data items are instead in the network and caching cost depends on where the data is located or cached inside the network. Thus caching cost depends on the network topology and distances among nodes. For example, in P2P networks, each peer initially has some data objects and shares with other peers; in sensor networks, sensor nodes sense and generate data which are transmitted back to the base station for analysis or accessed by other sensor nodes in the network. In both cases, data are originally generated and stored in the network.
Our model is geared towards multi-hop wireless ad hoc network, where the data items are initially at some nodes (called source nodes) in the network, and are subsequently cached by other nodes. Nodes that do not cache the data go to the closest cache node (including source node) to access the data. Unlike the facility location or k-median based approaches, in our model, the time sequence at which cache node is selected is important, since a new cache node always prefers to cache the data from the closest existing cache node. In our model, both data access cost and data caching cost (defined in Section III and IV) depend on the distances among nodes. Therefore, the efficiency of data caching scheme depends on not only the network topology and nodes' access patterns, but also the data items' locations in the network.
In particular, in our network model, there is one data item contained in a single source node, and multiple client nodes (that wish to access the data item). Different nodes have different demands (or access frequencies) towards the data item. We study the data caching problem where the goal is to determine a set of nodes in the network to cache/store the given data item, such that the total communication cost incurred in caching the data item and accessing the data item is minimized. We show our problem is NP-hard by a reduction to the facility location problem [6] . Furthermore, our model mandates the timeliness of selecting the cache nodes, by specifying which cache node caches data from which existing cache node. This timeliness distinguishes our model from data caching model based upon the well-known rent-or-buy problem [15] , a special case of the connected facility location problem [12, 13, 15] . The rent-or-buy problem is known to be NP-hard [15] . In rent-or-buy problem, one facility is already open, connecting the facilities incurs a cost which is proportional to the weight of the Steiner Tree connecting all the facilities [17] , and each client accesses its closest facility. The objective is to find a solution (i.e., to select the locations to build facilities and connect them by a Steiner tree) which minimizes the total cost.
In this paper, we show a pure Nash Equilibrium (NE) exists in our data caching model via a centralized construction. However, NE may not guarantee system-wide performance -due to the selfishness of self-interested nodes, the resultant social cost (total cost) could be much larger than the social optimal cost (minimum total cost). Papadimitriou et al. [9, 14] illustrate this using price of anarchy, which is the ratio of the social cost of the worst possible Nash equilibrium to the cost of the social optimal solution. We show that in our constructed NE, the price of anarchy could be as large as O(N ), where N is number of nodes in the network. Then, using an external incentive mechanism based upon a payment model, we show that social optimal can still be achieved while it is also a NE (i.e., with the price of anarchy O(1)). Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews both cooperative and selfish data caching in ad hoc networks and in distributed system as a whole. In Section III, we introduce our network model and formulate the data caching problem, and show its NP-hardness. In Section IV we formalize the selfish data caching problem and demonstrate by a construction that a pure Nash Equilibrium (NE) exists. Section V presents our payment model which achieves the optimal social cost as well as a NE. In Section VI, we conclude the paper and point out some future work.
II. RELATED WORK REVIEW A. Cooperative Caching in Ad Hoc Networks
There are lot of research designing distributed caching algorithms in ad hoc networks. Hara and Madria [5] are among the first to propose replica allocation methods in ad hoc networks, by taking into account the access frequency from mobile hosts to each data item and the status of the network connection. Yin and Cao [18] design and evaluate three simple distributed caching techniques, viz., CacheData which caches the passing-by data item, CachePath which caches the path to the nearest cache of the passingby data item, and HybridCache which caches the data item if its size is small enough, else caches the path to the data. Fiore et al. [4] design a cooperative caching scheme to create a content diversity in ad hoc networks, so that a requesting user likely finds the desired information nearby. Zhao et al. [19] propose a novel asymmetric cooperative cache approach, where the data requests are transmitted to the cache layer on every node, but the data replies are only transmitted to the cache layer at the intermediate nodes that need to cache the data.
Ko and Rubenstein [8] propose a distributed protocol that palaces replicated resources in a network such that the distance between identical copies of the same resource is large and each node is "close" to some copy of any resource. They study it by coloring each node, where each color is a replica the node is assigned. It proves the network can converge to a stable state following such protocol. In our previous work [16] , we present a polynomialtime centralized approximation algorithm to replicate data, which reduces the total data access delay at least half of that obtained from the optimal solution. We also show a distributed caching technique derived from the centralized approximation algorithm.
The data caching we study in this paper is closely related to the connected facility location problem [12, 13, 15] , which is NP-hard. Swamy et al. [15] give a 5-approximation algorithm. Nuggehalli et al. [13] study the same problem in the context of energy-efficient caching strategies in ad hoc networks. They provide a distributed solution that is within a factor of 6 of the optimal solution.
However, all of above work do not take into consideration of selfishness of the network node, which is the topic of this work.
B. Selfish Caching in Ad Hoc Networks and Distributed Systems
Chun et al. [2] are among the first to propose to study selfish caching in distributed systems using a gametheoretic approach. They consider one data object which is outside of the network. When a node decides to cache the data object, it assumes that the node always gets this data from outside of the network, which incurs a constant caching cost. A node either caches the data object in its local memory or accesses it from another node storing the object, depending on which costs less. They show that there exists a pure strategy NE based on above model. However, the total social cost can not achieve optimum due to selfish behavior of players. By extending above basic game with a payment model, in which each node bids for having an object replicated at another node, the authors show that the social optimal can be achieved.
Laoutaris et al. [10] study distributed selfish replication of multiple objects. Like [2] , their model assumes the set of objects are not in the network initially. It differs with that of [2] in the following aspects. First, the distances between nodes are not factored in when playing the game. Rather, it assumes that for each node, accessing an object from its local cache always costs t l , from another cache node t r , and from the origin server always t s , with t l ≤ t r ≤ t s . Second, it considers memory capacity of each node since multiple objects are involved. Third, the objective is to maximize the excess gain (access cost reduced due to caching), not minimizing the access cost. And in their model, they do not consider caching (or replication) cost.
Our work considers one in-network data item in a multi-hop ad hoc network, wherein both accessing cost and caching cost not only exist, but also are topology dependent.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Network Model and Notations. We model the ad hoc network as a connected general graph, G(V, E), where V is the set of nodes/vertices and E is the set of edges. We use n to denote the total number of nodes in the given network, i.e., n = |V |. There is a single data item D in the network, which is stored in its original source node S ∈ V . D is requested by other nodes in the networkeach node has its own access frequency towards the data (in terms of number of demands); the access frequency of node i is a i ∈ R + . Let d ij be the shortest distance (in terms of number of hops) between node i and node j, and let d(i, M ) = min j∈M d ij be the shortest distance from i to some node in a set of nodes M . Let mst mc(X) be the cost of a minimum spanning tree of the metric closure upon a set of nodes X ⊆ V . Here metric closure of X is defined as the complete graph upon X, wherein each edge is a shortest path between two nodes in X in the original network graph G(V, E). Given a set of cache nodes M where D is cached, the caching cost of node i ∈ M is proportional to its distance to another cache node in M from which it caches the data; the access cost of a non-
Data Caching Problem. The data caching problem based on above network model, which we call in Caching problem for the rest of the paper, can be formulated as follows. Given a network graph G(V, E), one data item and its source node, and access frequencies of all other client nodes, select a set of cache nodes such that the total access plus caching cost is minimized. For a given network graph G and a set of cache nodes M (source node S ∈ M ), the total cost in the network, denoted by τ (M ), is defined as:
In above equation, the terms on the right hand side represent total access cost and total caching cost in the network respectively. Here γ is a constant that indicates the relative weight of caching cost compared to access cost. Essentially, the data caching problem is to select a set of cache nodes such that the total cost τ is minimized.
Throughout the paper, we use C opt to denote the set of cache nodes (including S) in the optimal solution, i.e.,
Difference Between Our Model and Rent-or-Buy Based Model. In the rent-or-buy Problem [12, 13, 15] , connecting the facilities incurs a cost that is proportional to the cost of the Steiner Tree [17] connecting all the facilities, and each client accesses its closest facility. The objective of rent-orbuy problem is to select the locations to build facilities with minimum total access plus connecting cost. In the rent-orbuy based data caching model, an intermediate node (called Steiner node) between two cache nodes (called terminal nodes) can also cache a copy of the data. Our model does not allow this -in our model, a cache node always caches the data from another already existing cache/terminal node in the network. Thus our model has the favor of timeliness, which is the main characteristic distinguishing our data caching model from rent-or-buy based one. Theorem 1: The in Caching problem is NP-hard. Proof: The in Caching problem can be proved to be NPhard via a reduction from the facility location problem (FLP) [6] . The FLP is similar to in Caching problem with two differences: i) the data item is initially outside of the network and ii) the caching cost is a constant. In in caching problem, the caching cost of a cache node depends on its distance to another cache node from which it caches the data, thus is not the same for all the cache nodes. Therefore FLP is a special case of in Caching when caching cost is a constant, which shows in Caching problem is also NPhard.
IV. SELFISH CACHING GAME IN MULTI-HOP AD HOC NETWORKS
In selfish caching game, however, whether a node caches the data itself or accesses the data from other cache nodes depends on which costs less, not on optimal solution. Below we discuss the cost model in the selfish caching game, which is different from that in the data caching problem discussed in Section III.
Cost Model. For each non-source node, still, it either caches the data in its local memory (cache node) or accesses the data from others (non-cache node). There are two kinds of cost in our cost model: the access cost and the caching cost, which are denoted as α i or β i respectively for node i.
Access
Caching Cost. When a cache node i decides to cache data from other existing cache nodes, it goes to the closest one, say k, to fetch the data and cache it into its local memory. Thus i's caching cost β i is proportional to the shortest distance to cache node k and β i = γd ik . As in Section III, γ is a constant indicating the relative weight of caching cost to access cost.
Let the cost of node i of requesting D be τ i , then τ i is either α i or β i . The total cost of the network in NE is τ = i∈V τ i . Therefore, in a caching game where each node is selfish, whether a node i is a cache node or not only depends on a i and γ: If a i ≥ γ, i is a cache node and caches the data from its nearest existing cache node; if a i < γ, it is a non-cache node and accesses the data from its nearest cache node. We denote the set of cache nodes (including S) in a Nash Equilibrium as Below we show a property of the NE achieved in our caching game, which says that the cache node in NE is still a cache node in the optimal solution.
Lemma 1:
Proof: We prove it by contradiction. Assume node i ∈ C N but i / ∈ C opt . In the optimal solution, assume i accesses another cache node l for the data item. To further reduce the total cost, i can cache the data from l. This further reduces the total cost of the whole network by (a i −γ)×d il , contracting that it is the optimal solution. Therefore C N ⊆ C opt . We use C A to denote the set of non-cache nodes in NE that are cache nodes in the optimal solution, i.e.,
Caching Strategy. The caching strategy of node i, denoted as C i , includes the following. First, it decides whether it is a cache or not. Second, if yes, it decides from which cache node (parent cache node) it fetches the data and caches in its local memory; if no, it decides from which cache node it accesses the data. More formally,
where n i ∈ {yes, no} indicates if i is a cache or not, p i is the parent cache node of i if i is a cache node, and i accesses data from its closest cache node c i otherwise. We denote the strategy profile of the game as SP , and
Thus SP shows the global cache placement and data access in the whole network. Below, we first present the algorithm leading to a Nash Equilibrium. Then we present some interesting observation from our algorithm, which serves as the basis of Nash Equilibrium proof. Finally we discuss the Price of Anarchy of the achieved Nash Equilibrium. For the clarity of the presentation, we call a cache node before it caches data a potential cache node. Nash Equilibrium in Selfish Caching Game. The algorithm in caching game takes place in iterations. In each iteration, a node (potential cache node) is selected as cache node and caches data from an already existing cache node, the caching path being the shortest path between these two nodes. We have m − 1 non-source cache nodes, so our algorithm stops after m − 1 iterations. Below we give an algorithm that achieves Nash Equilibrium for our caching game. Minimum Caching Cost Algorithm for NE Construction. 1) Start with the source node S, find a potential cache node which has the minimum shortest distance to the source node (ties are broken arbitrarily). It is the new cache node. Move a copy of the data from the source node to the new cache node. 2) while (There is still un-cached potential cache node) Among all the shortest path linking any existing cache node (parent cache) to any potential cache node (child cache), find the one with the minimum cost. When there is a tie of the parent cache, choose the path with the parent cache of a lower ID; when there is tie of the child cache, tie is broken randomly. Move a copy of the data from the parent cache node to the child cache node. 3) For each of the non-cache nodes, find its nearest cache node from which it accesses the data. Above is essentially the minimum spanning tree algorithm upon the metric closure of all the cache nodes, which is in the same line as the total caching cost modeled 
t(P(k)) < t(i) < t(k)

Fig. 2. In a cache tree, if j / ∈ D(i), t(j) > t(i), and t(P
in Section III. Figure 1 (a) shows all the caching paths following above algorithm. For ease of presentation, the network is grid-like, where each node can only communicate directly with its (at most four) neighbors. Each node ID also indicates the iteration (time sequence) at which the cache node gets a data copy from its parent cache, as shown in the direction of the arrowed edge. In Section V, we will present a payment model which achieves gives a social optimal solution as well as a NE. In that case, given the same set of cache nodes C opt obtained from the social optimal solution, the caching path in the social optimal solution is the same as the caching path using minimum cost tree algorithm (provided that the ties are broken using the same choices when executing the minimum spanning tree algorithms in both the optimal solution and selfish caching game). Cache Tree. Above algorithm gives the parent-child relationship of all the cache nodes, indicating from which parent cache node that each child cache node directly caches the data item from. Consequently, this forms a tree rooted at source node S, with each edge being the shortest path between the two cache nodes. We call the tree cache tree. Figure 1 (b) shows the cache tree corresponding to the caching paths in Figure 1 (a) . The vertices of the cache tree is the set of cache nodes. Each edge represents a parent-child cache node relationship, the number on the edge indicating the cost of the shortest path between each pair of parent-child cache nodes, which is proportional to the caching cost. Below we give some definitions related to the cache tree.
Definition 1: (Parent Cache and Child Cache.) In cache tree, cache node i is the parent cache of cache node j, denoted as P (i), if j directly fetches the data from i. j is a child cache of i.
Definition 2: (Ancestor Cache and Descendant Cache.) Cache node i is an ancestor cache of cache node j (i = j) if i is on the unique path from S to j in the cache tree. That is, j directly or indirectly fetches the data from i. j is a descendant cache of i.
Definition 3: (Descendant Set.) The descendant set of cache node i, denoted as D(i), is all the nodes in the subtree rooted at i. That is, such subtree is the set of i's descendant caches. For example, the descendant set D(S) of source node S is the whole cache tree excluding S itself.
Definition 4: (Selected Time of Cache Node.) Since in caching game, each potential cache node is selected as cache node one by one and caches data, the cache nodes in the resulted cache tree can be ordered using their selected time. We use t(i) to indicate the time sequence at which i is selected as cache node and assume t(S) = 0.
For any cache node i, we have t(D(i)) > t(i).
Discussion of the Selection of Parent Cache.
In the caching game, when i is selected to become a cache node, it chooses the existing nearest cache node, P (i), as its parent cache and fetches the data from there. We note that later a newly selected cache node j could be closer to i than P (i), causing i to deviate and cache the data from j. Surprisingly, we show that for all the cache nodes selected after i, only nodes in D(i) can possibly be closer to i than P (i). Formally, Lemma 2 below shows that if a cache node j caches after cache node i, and j is not a descendant of i, then i does not have incentive to deviate to cache from j.
Lemma 2: For two cache nodes i and j in a cache tree, if t(j) > t(i) and j / ∈ D(i), i does not have incentive to deviate from its parent cache P (i) to have j as its parent cache. Proof: As shown in Figure 2 , since t(j) > t(i) and j / ∈ D(i), along the path from j to S (including j and S), there must exist one cache node, say k, with t(P (k)) < t(i) < t(k). We have |iP (i)| < |kP (k)| (note P (i) and P (k) could be the same node). This is because at the iteration when i is selected as the cache node and caches data from P (i), iP (i) is the minimum shortest path among all the shortest paths connecting any cache node to any potential cache node. Using the similar argument, we have |kP (k)| < |ji|. So we have |iP (i)| < |ij|, i does not have incentive to cache from j.
For example, in Figure 1 (a), since t(6) < t(9) and node 9 / ∈ D(6), node 6 will not deviate from its parent cache node 2 to cache from node 9. This can be confirmed by that the distance between node 6 and node 2 is 3 hops, which is less than distance between node 6 and node 9, which is 7 hops.
Observation. In our in-network data item model, it is not allowed that an ancestor node accesses or caches from its descendant nodes, because this violates their intrinsic ancestor-descendant relationship. This observation, together with Lemma 2, lead to below theorem about the Nash Equilibrium construction.
Theorem 2: Above minimum caching cost algorithm reaches NE. Proof: According to the minimum caching cost algorithm, it is trivial that for any cache node i, it will not deviate from P (i) to another cache node j where T (i) > T(j). From Lemma 2, i will not deviate to any cache node j where j / ∈ D(i) and t(j) > T (i). In our in-network data item model, it is prohibited that i cache or access from any node in D(i).
For any non-cache node, since it accesses the closest cache node, it will not deviate also.
Price of Anarchy (PoA). We show the PoA of our obtained 
NE. Lemma 3:
If a i ≥ γ for all i ∈ V , the PoA of the game is O(1). Proof: In this case, all the nodes in the network are cache nodes. So τ = i∈V γd iP (i) . The minimum caching cost algorithm of above is essentially a minimum spanning tree algorithm, which is optimal. So PoA of the game is O(1).
Lemma 4:
If a i < γ for some i ∈ V , the PoA of the game can be O(n), where n = |V |. Proof: In this case, some nodes in the network are noncache nodes. We prove this by showing an example depicted in Figure 3 . In this example, node 2 is a non-cache node, nodes 3, 4, ..., n − 1, n are cache nodes. The distance between node 2 and source node S is 1 and the distance between nodes 3, 4, ..., n − 1, n to node 2 is 0. The NE gives that τ = a 2 + (n − 2) × γ. However, the social optimal solution is node 2 caches the data while nodes 3, 4, ..., n − 1, n access data from node 2, yielding optimal total cost τ = γ. The PoA of this example is therefore O(n).
Lemma 4 shows that due to the non-cooperation among selfish nodes, the social optimal is not achieved in the NE. Below, we present a payment-based mechanism wherein some non-cache nodes are made payment by other nodes. We show our proposed mechanism can achieve both NE and social optimal.
V. PAYMENT MECHANISM
In this section, we design a payment-based mechanism wherein a NE is achieved while its total cost is equal to the social optimal. Note we use C A to denote the set of non-cache nodes in original NE that are cache nodes in the optimal solution. The idea of our payment-based mechanism is to motivate the nodes in C A to cache data such that the total cost of the network reaches optimal. For this, each node who benefits from such caching makes some amount of bid to this node. If this node caches the data, then the bidding node must pay the bided amount to the caching node. The payment mechanism decides for each caching node in C A , beyond how much bid it receives that it is willing to cache the data. Using this payment mechanism, we show that both Nash Equilibrium and social optimal can be achieved.
As in [2] , we define the strategy of each node i in the payment game as a triplet (v i , b i , t i ) ∈ {N, R+, R+}, indicating i) node i makes b i amount of bid to node v i and ii) node i's threshold value of received bid is t i beyond which i will cache the data. We use B i to denote the total amount of bid that node i receives, i.e., B i = {j|i=vj } b j . A node i will cache the data if and only if B i ≥ t i .
Lemma 5: For any i ∈ C
A , for cache node j = i, j ∈ {C opt −D(i)}, its caching cost does not depend on whether i caches or not. In other words, removal of i will not affect the caching path of j / ∈ D i .
Proof: If t(j) < t(i), j's caching path is not affected because it caches before j caches. If t(j) > t(i), since j / ∈ {D(i)}, by way of contradiction, if j changes its parent cache from P (j) to another cache node, say k, as the result of minimum spanning tree algorithm upon the metric closure of all the nodes in C opt − i, this results that the cache tree of all nodes in C opt is not minimum, which contradicts with the fact that such tree is minimum spanning tree upon the metric closure of all the nodes in C opt .
So only nodes in D(i) can possibly change their caching paths if i ∈ C
A decides not to cache. Now we discuss the payment mechanism in the optimal solution. For each cache node i ∈ C A , we denote the set of non-cache nodes accessing data from i as Θ i .
Definition 5: (Benefit of cache node i to non-cache node j ∈ Θ i .) We define the benefit of cache node i to non-cache node j ∈ Θ i (i.e., a j < γ), denoted as ψ j , as the minimum extra cost incurred to j if i is not a cache, and therefore j has to access the data from another cache node closest to it in C opt . Formally,
Definition 6: (Benefit of cache node i to another cache node k ∈ D(i).) We define the benefit of cache node i to another cache node k ∈ D(i), denoted as φ k , as the minimum extra cost incurred to k if i decides not to cache, thus k has to cache the data from another cache node closest to it. Formally,
is the parent cache of k when the set of cache nodes are C opt − {i}, and p(k) is the parent cache of k when the set of cache nodes are C opt .
Definition 7: (Benefit and average benefit of cache node i to the whole network.) Now, the benefit of cache node i to the whole network, denoted as NB i , is the saving of the total cost due to caching at i. Formally, Proof: By way of contradiction, assume nb i < 0 in the optimal solution. That is, j∈Θi ψ j + k∈D(i) φ k − (γ − a i ) < 0. Consider a new caching solution where i decides not to cache and thus each node in Θ i and D(i) chooses its next best strategy. All other nodes in C opt − i are still cache nodes. It is easy to see that the optimal cost minus the cost of the new caching solution is at least:
which contradicts the optimality of the optimal solution.
Payment mechanism. The bid of each node is set as follows. For each j ∈ Θ i , the amount j bids i is b j = max{0, ψ j − nb i }. For each k ∈ D(i), the amount k bids i is b k = max{0, φ k − nb i }. That is, each node bids the amount which it benefits more than the average benefit of the network due to i's caching. For other nodes l / ∈ Θ i ∪ D(i) ∪ {i}, the amount l bids i is b l = 0. The threshold of i t i is given as:
For all the non-cache nodes in the optimal solution, their threshold is 0 too.
Below we show that above payment mechanism yields social optimal as well as Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 3: The payment mechanism reaches NE, and it yields social optimal for the whole network. Proof: We need to show with the payment mechanism, all the nodes in the optimal solution has no incentive to deviate, as long as others stay with their strategies.
First, we show that for node i ∈ C A , it better off caches the data in spite of the fact that a i ≤ γ. We have Above shows that for cache nodes in the optimal solution that are not cache node in the previous NE, the amount of bids they collect is more than the extra cost they incur due to caching. They better off to caching and has no incentive to deviate.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We apply game-theoretical analysis for the selfish caching in wireless ad hoc networks. Our model considers distance-dependent caching cost, which is different from previous work. We first show a pure Nash Equilibrium (NE) exists in our model. We then design a payment model, in which the selfish caching game achieves both optimal cost and NE simultaneously. Our model is more general and applicable than existing work for such emerging networks as P2P and wireless ad hoc sensor networks. As the ongoing and future work, we are validating our findings using simulations under various network scenarios.
